Limpieza al .bib

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NikaZhenya 2017-12-08 10:46:09 -06:00
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commit 423b990a6b
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@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
title = {Intellectual Property in Philosophy},
journal = {ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy},
year = {2004},
publisher = {Franz Steiner Verlag},
volume = {90},
number = {1},
pages = {20--50},
@ -73,7 +74,6 @@
keywords = {Primaria},
leido = {true},
notas = {The article deals with the concept of intellectual property and its basis in different philosophical theories. First, the author gives a short historical overview of the development of intellectual property, locating its roots already in pre-historical society. It is followed by an examination of today's features of intellectual property, in contrast to 'regular' property. In the second part, the article analyses the theories of Locke, Kant, Hegel, Servan and Foucault to explain intellectual property, followed by a discussion which of their theories' features are reflected by today's intellectual property law.},
publisher = {Franz Steiner Verlag},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681627},
}
@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
title = {The Moral Foundations of Intangible Property},
journal = {The Monist},
year = {1990},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
volume = {73},
number = {4},
pages = {578--600},
@ -133,7 +134,6 @@
groups = {Primaria},
keywords = {Primaria},
leido = {false},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
timestamp = {2017-02-19},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903211},
}
@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
title = {Natural Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Domain},
journal = {The Modern Law Review},
year = {2010},
publisher = {[Modern Law Review, Wiley]},
volume = {73},
number = {2},
pages = {208--239},
@ -152,7 +153,6 @@
keywords = {Secundaria},
leido = {false},
notas = {No natural rights theory justifies strong intellectual property rights. More specifically, no theory within the entire domain of natural rights thinking — encompassing classical liberalism, libertarianism and left-libertarianism, in all their innumerable variants — coherently supports strengthening current intellectual property rights. Despite their many important différences, all these natural rights theories endorse some set of members of a common family of basic ethical precepts. These commitments include non-interference, fairness, non-worsening, consistency, universalisability, prior consent, self-ownership, self-governance, and the establishment of zones of autonomy. Such commitments have clear applications pertaining to the use and ownership of created ideas. I argue that each of these commitments require intellectual property rights to be substantially limited in scope, strength and duration. In this way the core mechanisms of natural rights thinking ensure a robust public domain and categorically rule out strong intellectual property rights.},
publisher = {[Modern Law Review, Wiley]},
timestamp = {2017-02-19},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40660697},
}
@ -267,6 +267,7 @@
title = {Justifying Intellectual Property},
journal = {Philosophy \& Public Affairs},
year = {1989},
publisher = {Wiley},
volume = {18},
number = {1},
pages = {31--52},
@ -275,7 +276,6 @@
groups = {Secundaria},
keywords = {Secundaria},
leido = {false},
publisher = {Wiley},
timestamp = {2017-02-19},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265190},
}

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@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
title = {Intellectual Property in Philosophy},
journal = {ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy},
year = {2004},
publisher = {Franz Steiner Verlag},
volume = {90},
number = {1},
pages = {20--50},
@ -73,7 +74,6 @@
keywords = {Primaria},
leido = {true},
notas = {The article deals with the concept of intellectual property and its basis in different philosophical theories. First, the author gives a short historical overview of the development of intellectual property, locating its roots already in pre-historical society. It is followed by an examination of today's features of intellectual property, in contrast to 'regular' property. In the second part, the article analyses the theories of Locke, Kant, Hegel, Servan and Foucault to explain intellectual property, followed by a discussion which of their theories' features are reflected by today's intellectual property law.},
publisher = {Franz Steiner Verlag},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681627},
}
@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
title = {The Moral Foundations of Intangible Property},
journal = {The Monist},
year = {1990},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
volume = {73},
number = {4},
pages = {578--600},
@ -133,7 +134,6 @@
groups = {Primaria},
keywords = {Primaria},
leido = {false},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
timestamp = {2017-02-19},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903211},
}
@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
title = {Natural Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Domain},
journal = {The Modern Law Review},
year = {2010},
publisher = {[Modern Law Review, Wiley]},
volume = {73},
number = {2},
pages = {208--239},
@ -152,7 +153,6 @@
keywords = {Secundaria},
leido = {false},
notas = {No natural rights theory justifies strong intellectual property rights. More specifically, no theory within the entire domain of natural rights thinking — encompassing classical liberalism, libertarianism and left-libertarianism, in all their innumerable variants — coherently supports strengthening current intellectual property rights. Despite their many important différences, all these natural rights theories endorse some set of members of a common family of basic ethical precepts. These commitments include non-interference, fairness, non-worsening, consistency, universalisability, prior consent, self-ownership, self-governance, and the establishment of zones of autonomy. Such commitments have clear applications pertaining to the use and ownership of created ideas. I argue that each of these commitments require intellectual property rights to be substantially limited in scope, strength and duration. In this way the core mechanisms of natural rights thinking ensure a robust public domain and categorically rule out strong intellectual property rights.},
publisher = {[Modern Law Review, Wiley]},
timestamp = {2017-02-19},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40660697},
}
@ -267,6 +267,7 @@
title = {Justifying Intellectual Property},
journal = {Philosophy \& Public Affairs},
year = {1989},
publisher = {Wiley},
volume = {18},
number = {1},
pages = {31--52},
@ -275,7 +276,6 @@
groups = {Secundaria},
keywords = {Secundaria},
leido = {false},
publisher = {Wiley},
timestamp = {2017-02-19},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265190},
}
@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@
title = {Comunicado de la comunidad sobre Ley de Software Libre y Formatos Abiertos en el Estado},
organization = {SoftwareLibre},
url = {https://www.softwarelibre.edu.uy/Comunicado+Ley+de+Software+Libre},
file = {:recursos/sledu2013a.htm:URL},
file = {:recursos/sledu2017a.html:URL},
groups = {Secundaria},
keywords = {Secundaria},
timestamp = {2017-03-22},

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