import hmac
from uuid import uuid4
from base64 import b64encode, b64decode
import hashlib
from stringprep import (
    in_table_a1, in_table_b1, in_table_c21_c22, in_table_c3, in_table_c4,
    in_table_c5, in_table_c6, in_table_c7, in_table_c8, in_table_c9,
    in_table_c12, in_table_d1, in_table_d2)
import unicodedata
from os import urandom
from enum import IntEnum, unique

# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5802
# https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7677.txt


@unique
class ClientStage(IntEnum):
    get_client_first = 1
    set_server_first = 2
    get_client_final = 3
    set_server_final = 4


@unique
class ServerStage(IntEnum):
    set_client_first = 1
    get_server_first = 2
    set_client_final = 3
    get_server_final = 4


def _check_stage(Stages, current_stage, next_stage):
    if current_stage is None:
        if next_stage != 1:
            raise ScramException(
                "The method " + Stages(1).name + " must be called first.")
    elif current_stage == 4:
        raise ScramException(
            "The authentication sequence has already finished.")
    elif next_stage != current_stage + 1:
        raise ScramException(
            "The next method to be called is " + Stages(current_stage + 1) +
            ", not this method.")


class ScramException(Exception):
    pass


MECHANISMS = ('SCRAM-SHA-1', 'SCRAM-SHA-256')


HASHES = {
    'SCRAM-SHA-1': hashlib.sha1,
    'SCRAM-SHA-256': hashlib.sha256
}


class ScramClient():
    def __init__(self, mechanisms, username, password, c_nonce=None):
        self.mech = None
        for mech in MECHANISMS:
            if mech in mechanisms:
                self.mech = mech

        if self.mech is None:
            raise ScramException(
                "The only recognized mechanisms are " + str(MECHANISMS) +
                "and none of those can be found in " + mechanisms + ".")

        self.hf = HASHES[self.mech]

        if c_nonce is None:
            self.c_nonce = _make_nonce()
        else:
            self.c_nonce = c_nonce

        self.username = username
        self.password = password
        self.stage = None

    def _set_stage(self, next_stage):
        _check_stage(ClientStage, self.stage, next_stage)
        self.stage = next_stage

    def get_client_first(self):
        self._set_stage(ClientStage.get_client_first)
        self.client_first_bare, client_first = _get_client_first(
            self.username, self.c_nonce)
        return client_first

    def set_server_first(self, message):
        self._set_stage(ClientStage.set_server_first)
        self.server_first = message
        self.auth_message, self.nonce, self.salt, self.iterations = \
            _set_server_first(message, self.c_nonce, self.client_first_bare)

    def get_client_final(self):
        self._set_stage(ClientStage.get_client_final)
        self.server_signature, cfinal = _get_client_final(
            self.hf, self.password, self.salt, self.iterations, self.nonce,
            self.auth_message)
        return cfinal

    def set_server_final(self, message):
        self._set_stage(ClientStage.set_server_final)
        _set_server_final(message, self.server_signature)


class ScramServer():
    def __init__(
            self, password_fn, s_nonce=None, iterations=4096, salt=None,
            mechanism='SCRAM-SHA-256'):
        if mechanism not in MECHANISMS:
            raise ScramException(
                "The only recognized mechanisms are " + str(MECHANISMS) +
                ".")
        self.mechanism = mechanism
        self.hf = HASHES[self.mechanism]

        if s_nonce is None:
            self.s_nonce = _make_nonce()
        else:
            self.s_nonce = s_nonce

        if salt is None:
            self.salt = _b64enc(urandom(16))
        else:
            self.salt = salt

        self.password_fn = password_fn
        self.iterations = iterations
        self.stage = None

    def _set_stage(self, next_stage):
        _check_stage(ServerStage, self.stage, next_stage)
        self.stage = next_stage

    def set_client_first(self, client_first):
        self._set_stage(ServerStage.set_client_first)
        self.nonce, self.user, self.client_first_bare = _set_client_first(
            client_first, self.s_nonce)
        self.password = self.password_fn(self.user)

    def get_server_first(self):
        self._set_stage(ServerStage.get_server_first)
        self.auth_message, server_first = _get_server_first(
            self.nonce, self.salt, self.iterations, self.client_first_bare)
        return server_first

    def set_client_final(self, client_final):
        self._set_stage(ServerStage.set_client_final)
        self.server_signature = _set_client_final(
            self.hf, client_final, self.s_nonce, self.password, self.salt,
            self.iterations, self.auth_message)

    def get_server_final(self):
        self._set_stage(ServerStage.get_server_final)
        return _get_server_final(self.server_signature)


def _make_nonce():
    return str(uuid4()).replace('-', '')


def _make_auth_message(nonce, client_first_bare, server_first):
    msg = client_first_bare, server_first, 'c=' + _b64enc(b'n,,'), 'r=' + nonce
    return ','.join(msg)


def _proof_signature(hf, password, salt, iterations, auth_msg):
    salted_password = _hi(
        hf, _uenc(saslprep(password)), _b64dec(salt), iterations)
    client_key = _hmac(hf, salted_password, b"Client Key")
    stored_key = _h(hf, client_key)

    client_signature = _hmac(hf, stored_key, _uenc(auth_msg))
    client_proof = _xor(client_key, client_signature)

    server_key = _hmac(hf, salted_password, b"Server Key")
    server_signature = _hmac(hf, server_key, _uenc(auth_msg))
    return _b64enc(client_proof), _b64enc(server_signature)


def _hmac(hf, key, msg):
    return hmac.new(key, msg=msg, digestmod=hf).digest()


def _h(hf, msg):
    return hf(msg).digest()


def _hi(hf, password, salt, iterations):
    u = ui = _hmac(hf, password, salt + b'\x00\x00\x00\x01')
    for i in range(iterations - 1):
        ui = _hmac(hf, password, ui)
        u = _xor(u, ui)
    return u


def _hi_iter(password, mac, iterations):
    if iterations == 0:
        return mac
    else:
        new_mac = _hmac(password, mac)
        return _xor(_hi_iter(password, new_mac, iterations-1), mac)


def _parse_message(msg):
    return dict((e[0], e[2:]) for e in msg.split(',') if len(e) > 1)


def _b64enc(binary):
    return b64encode(binary).decode('utf8')


def _b64dec(string):
    return b64decode(string)


def _uenc(string):
    return string.encode('utf-8')


def _xor(bytes1, bytes2):
    return bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(bytes1, bytes2))


def _get_client_first(username, c_nonce):
    bare = ','.join(('n=' + saslprep(username), 'r=' + c_nonce))
    return bare, 'n,,' + bare


def _set_client_first(client_first, s_nonce):
    msg = _parse_message(client_first)
    c_nonce = msg['r']
    nonce = c_nonce + s_nonce
    user = msg['n']
    client_first_bare = client_first[3:]

    return nonce, user, client_first_bare


def _get_server_first(nonce, salt, iterations, client_first_bare):
    sfirst = ','.join(('r=' + nonce, 's=' + salt, 'i=' + str(iterations)))
    auth_msg = _make_auth_message(nonce, client_first_bare, sfirst)
    return auth_msg, sfirst


def _set_server_first(server_first, c_nonce, client_first_bare):
    msg = _parse_message(server_first)
    nonce = msg['r']
    salt = msg['s']
    iterations = int(msg['i'])

    if not nonce.startswith(c_nonce):
        raise ScramException("Client nonce doesn't match.")

    auth_msg = _make_auth_message(nonce, client_first_bare, server_first)
    return auth_msg, nonce, salt, iterations


def _get_client_final(hf, password, salt, iterations, nonce, auth_msg):
    client_proof, server_signature = _proof_signature(
            hf, password, salt, iterations, auth_msg)

    message = ['c=' + _b64enc(b'n,,'), 'r=' + nonce, 'p=' + client_proof]
    return server_signature, ','.join(message)


def _set_client_final(
        hf, client_final, s_nonce, password, salt, iterations, auth_msg):

    msg = _parse_message(client_final)
    nonce = msg['r']
    proof = msg['p']

    if not nonce.endswith(s_nonce):
        raise ScramException("Server nonce doesn't match.")

    client_proof, server_signature = _proof_signature(
        hf, password, salt, iterations, auth_msg)

    if client_proof != proof:
        raise ScramException("The proofs don't match")

    return server_signature


def _get_server_final(server_signature):
    return 'v=' + server_signature


def _set_server_final(message, server_signature):
    msg = _parse_message(message)
    if server_signature != msg['v']:
        raise ScramException("The server signature doesn't match.")


def saslprep(source):
    # mapping stage
    #   - map non-ascii spaces to U+0020 (stringprep C.1.2)
    #   - strip 'commonly mapped to nothing' chars (stringprep B.1)
    data = ''.join(
        ' ' if in_table_c12(c) else c for c in source if not in_table_b1(c))

    # normalize to KC form
    data = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', data)
    if not data:
        return ''

    # check for invalid bi-directional strings.
    # stringprep requires the following:
    #   - chars in C.8 must be prohibited.
    #   - if any R/AL chars in string:
    #       - no L chars allowed in string
    #       - first and last must be R/AL chars
    # this checks if start/end are R/AL chars. if so, prohibited loop
    # will forbid all L chars. if not, prohibited loop will forbid all
    # R/AL chars instead. in both cases, prohibited loop takes care of C.8.
    is_ral_char = in_table_d1
    if is_ral_char(data[0]):
        if not is_ral_char(data[-1]):
            raise ValueError("malformed bidi sequence")
        # forbid L chars within R/AL sequence.
        is_forbidden_bidi_char = in_table_d2
    else:
        # forbid R/AL chars if start not setup correctly; L chars allowed.
        is_forbidden_bidi_char = is_ral_char

    # check for prohibited output
    # stringprep tables A.1, B.1, C.1.2, C.2 - C.9
    for c in data:
        # check for chars mapping stage should have removed
        assert not in_table_b1(c), "failed to strip B.1 in mapping stage"
        assert not in_table_c12(c), "failed to replace C.1.2 in mapping stage"

        # check for forbidden chars
        for f, msg in (
                (in_table_a1, "unassigned code points forbidden"),
                (in_table_c21_c22, "control characters forbidden"),
                (in_table_c3, "private use characters forbidden"),
                (in_table_c4, "non-char code points forbidden"),
                (in_table_c5, "surrogate codes forbidden"),
                (in_table_c6, "non-plaintext chars forbidden"),
                (in_table_c7, "non-canonical chars forbidden"),
                (in_table_c8, "display-modifying/deprecated chars forbidden"),
                (in_table_c9, "tagged characters forbidden"),
                (is_forbidden_bidi_char, "forbidden bidi character")):
            if f(c):
                raise ValueError(msg)

    return data